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Abstract—An increasing number of sensors on mobile, Internet
of things (IoT), and wearable devices generate time-series
measurements of physical activities. Though access to the sensory
data is critical to the success of many beneficial applications such
as health monitoring or activity recognition, a wide range of
potentially sensitive information about the individuals can also
be discovered through access to sensory data and this cannot
easily be protected using traditional privacy approaches.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving sensing
framework for managing access to time-series data in order to
provide utility while protecting individuals’ privacy. We introduce
Replacement AutoEncoder, a novel algorithm which learns how
to transform discriminative features of data that correspond to
sensitive inferences, into some features that have been more
observed in non-sensitive inferences, to protect users’ privacy.
This efficiency is achieved by defining a user-customized objective
function for deep autoencoders. Our replacement method will not
only eliminate the possibility of recognizing sensitive inferences,
it also eliminates the possibility of detecting the occurrence of
them. That is the main weakness of other approaches such
as filtering or randomization. We evaluate the efficacy of the
algorithm with an activity recognition task in a multi-sensing
environment using extensive experiments on three benchmark
datasets. We show that it can retain the recognition accuracy of
state-of-the-art techniques while simultaneously preserving the
privacy of sensitive information. Finally, we utilize the GANs
for detecting the occurrence of replacement, after releasing data,
and show that this can be done only if the adversarial network
is trained on the users’ original data.
Index Terms—Privacy Protection; Feature Learning;
Time-Series Analysis; Wearable Sensors; Activity Recognition;
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart devices around us are becoming more interconnected
and a large variety of data are captured by these sensors
on a regular basis. From smartphones, to smart watches and
wearables, many of our modern electronic devices have the
ability to produce data. Since detailed, personally-identifying
datasets in their original form often contain sensitive
information about individuals, inconspicuous data collection
can lead to major personal privacy concerns. As an example,
just ambient light sensor data [1] or accelerometer readings [2]
are sufficient to extract sequences of entered text on
smartphones and consequently to reveal users’ passwords.
Moreover, Apthorpe et al. [3] examine four IoT smart home
devices and find that their network traffic rates can reveal
potentially sensitive user interactions even when the traffic
is encrypted. Therefore, trustworthy analysis of time-series
Fig. 1. (Left) We assume each section of a multivariate time-series contains
information about a specific inference that is categorized into two classes:
Sensitive and Non-Sensitive (including Desired). (Right) The ultimate goal
is hiding sensitive information by transforming each sensitive section into a
non-sensitive (non-desired) one while keep the remaining sections unmodified.
sensory data without any revelation of sensitive information
to third parties is a challenging task.
Recent advances in mobile and ubiquitous computing
technologies have concurrently accelerated the interest in
cloud services. One of the most desired applications of these
services is the recognition of current user activity and actuate a
response (such as displaying alerts or turning a device on/off).
However, omnipresent data gathering and user tracking leads
to inherent data security and privacy risks [4]. The main
question is how desired statistics of personal time-series can
be released to an untrusted third party without compromising
the individual’s privacy. More precisely, we consider how to
transform time-series sensor data in such a way that after
release, unwanted sensitive information cannot be inferred, but
features the user wishes to share are preserved.
In this paper, thanks to recent advances in feature
learning and autoencoder architectures [5], we develop a
privacy-preserving platform for the analysis of multichannel
time-series data generated by IoT sensors. Autoencoders are
neural networks trained to reconstruct their original input,
which can be considered as a form of feature extraction
algorithm (we will describe it in section IV). We consider
existing approaches for preserving inference privacy in
time-series data analysis and categorize the inferences that
can be made into three disjoint sets: black-listed (sensitive for
users), gray-listed (non-sensitive for users and not desired for
applications) and white-listed (required to gain utility from
third party services). Therefore, we propose a feature-based
replacement method to eliminate sensitive information in
time-series by transforming them to non-sensitive data (see
Figure 1). By applying our method, data utility will be
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unaffected for specific applications and cloud apps can
accurately infer the desired information, while it would be
very difficult to detect and almost impossible to recognize
a sensitive inference in the shared data. Specifically, our
contributions are:
• Inspired by denoising autoencoders [5], we introduce a
deep autoencoder architecture which is able to flexibly
and adaptively extract useful features from time-series
data. This real-time algorithm which we call replacement
autoencoder (RAE) learns how to replace features
of each section of time-series which correspond to
sensitive (black-listed) inferences with some values which
correspond to non-sensitive (gray-listed) inferences.
• To evaluate the tradeoff between data utility and inference
privacy, we apply the algorithm to activity recognition
task on three benchmark datasets collected from smart
wearable devices. We show how it can retain the
recognition accuracy of state-of-the-art techniques [6,
7] for desired inferences, and simultaneously preserve
the privacy of data subject by protecting sensitive
information.
• Finally, by utilizing the power of Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs) [8], we show that adversaries can
detect the presence of data replacement, by distinguishing
between real gray-listed data and replaced data
(transformed black-listed), only under the assumption that
they are able to access the user’s gray-listed dataset
which was used to train his/her model. Though even
under this assumption, recognition of the type of sensitive
inferences (without any other side information) is still
almost impossible.
Compared to other work on preserving the privacy of
sensitive data by anonymization or randomization techniques
in databases [9, 10], we consider a new situation dealing
with real-time sensory data. In our setting an untrusted cloud
application knows the users’ identity (thus differential privacy
[11] is not applicable) and we want to prevent that application
inferring sensitive information from their personal data. The
proposed platform enables users to protect their sensitive data,
while benefiting from sharing their non-sensitive data with
cloud apps.1
II. INFERENCE PRIVACY
A time-series is a collection of observations obtained
through repeated measurements over successive equally
spaced points in time. The collection of sensory data,
from IoT, mobile, or wearable devices, generates time-series
measurements of physical quantities such as velocity
and acceleration that offers tremendous opportunities for
applications. For example, monitoring different physiological
parameters using accelerometer and pressure sensor can create
time-series for monitoring users’ health status [12]. However,
malicious programs can secretly collect the time-series and use
1All the code and data used in this paper is publicly available and can be
obtained from: https://github.com/mmalekzadeh/replacement-autoencoder
them to discover a wide range of sensitive information about
users’ activities [13].
In ubiquitous sensing, the privacy of sensitive inferences
is formulated as a tradeoff between users’ need to receive
utility from third parties with the amount of information
inferred from shared time-series [14]. In this setting, it is
often observed that some sections of the time-series can
be used to infer sensitive information about their users’
behavior (black-listed), and the rest of the sections contains
information about desired information (white-listed) [15].
Here, we introduce a third kind of information in sensory data:
those sections of the time-series that contain non-sensitive
information (gray-listed). Therefore, throughout this paper we
discuss three kinds of inference (see Figure 1):
• black-listed Inferences: sensitive information that users
wish to keep private and should not be revealed to
third parties. The black-listed inferences are sufficiently
sensitive that the user would wish to prevent inference
that they have undertaken any activities within this set
even if the third party did not know which specific
inference.
• white-listed Inferences: desired information that users
gain utility from sharing with third parties services.
• gray-listed Inferences: non-sensitive information that is
neutral. It is not useful to the user that this information
is detected by third parties yet it is not important for the
user to hide it. It may include data that cannot be mapped
to a known behavior.
For example, consider a step counter application for a smart
watch that uses time-series data generated by equipped sensors
for counting the owner’s steps. These rich time-series can
be used for recognizing many activities, such as Walking,
Jogging, Running, Sitting, Lying, Drinking, Smoking, Fighting,
and Sleeping. For an example user white-listed inferences
could be Walking, Jogging, and Running, black-listed ones
could be Drinking, Smoking, Fighting, and Sleeping, and
finally, gray-listed inferences could be Sitting and Lying. It is
necessary to point out that, in comparison to static databases,
there are also many possible real situations which in sensory
data correspond to non-sensitive inferences. Consider the
number of different possible orientations you can rotate your
hand and corresponding data associated with them measured
by equipped sensors in your smart watch [16]. Hence, it would
be reasonable to safely replace sensitive sections of time-series
with non-sensitive real sections in a way that no information
about the replacement operation could leak to the other party.
Generally, there are four privacy-preserving approaches
to dealing with this kind of personal time-series:
(A) Randomization: adding noise to sensitive sections
of the time-series to make them harder to understand.
(B) Filtering: removing sensitive sections of the time-series
to avoid any inference. (C) Mapping: projection of the
original time-series into a lower dimensional space to reduce
the amount of information included in data. (D) Replacement:
replacement of sensitive sections of the time-series with some
non-sensitive data. In the following, we discuss why the first
three approaches are not suitable and how we can cover all
of their disadvantages by using the fourth approach.
A. Randomization
Generally, in this approach an independent [17] or a
correlated [18] noise (additive or multiplicative) is added
to time-series for hiding sensitive information. Kargupta
et al. [17] have empirically shown that independent random
noise with low variance preserves very little data privacy
since most of the noise can be filtered, and high variance
noise completely destroys the utility of data mining. Similarly,
Wang et al. [19] argued that independent and identically
distributed Laplace noise series used in current approaches
can be removed from the correlated time-series by utilizing a
refinement method (e.g. filtering). To remedy this problem,
they proposed a correlated Laplace mechanism which
guarantees that the correlation between the noise and original
time-series is indistinguishable to an adversary. However, their
method does not support non-stationary and high-dimensional
time-series. Perturbed sections can be easily detected by
adversaries and adding correlated noise to each sensitive
section, based on its own structure and features, will be very
challenging. The main challenge is to generate a correlated
noise that after adding to data, the detection of black-listed
sections of the time-series will be impossible. We show how
feature-based replacement can answer this challenge.
B. Filtering
In the filtering approach, instead of perturbation or
randomization, we can completely remove sensitive sections of
time-series data before publishing. For example, MaskIt [20] is
a filtering technique that decides whether to release or suppress
the current state of the smartphone users (e.g. current location).
By doing this, recognition of black-listed activities will be
very hard by third parties because no information about them
is published. However, detection of time intervals associated
with sensitive activities will be very simple, hence a side
channel attack is possible. For example if an attacker gets
access to user’s web browser history, then they might know
that currently they are in a pub, so the filtered out data could
correspond to “Drinking”. In addition, some sections of a
multichannel time-series can include both sensitive and desired
information, so entirely removing them can greatly reduce the
efficiency of data. We discuss how feature learning enables us
to efficiently remove sensitive information from multichannel
time-series without completely filtering them out.
C. Mapping
In this approach, instead of the original high dimensional
time-series, from which inferring unnecessary sensitive
information will be easy, a small set of features is extracted
from data and published to third parties. This is done in
such a way that the data can be only useful for inferring
desired (white-listed) information. In fact, feature sharing can
be considered as a mapping mechanism to control and reduce
the inferences possible from shared sensory data [21]. Laforet
et al. [22] introduced an optimization method to generate
and publish an entirely new time-series from the original
ones by considering some predefined constraints on the type
of information that can be inferred. Another solution would
be to publish just task-relevant high-level features. Recently,
Osia et al. [23] introduced an algorithm in deep learning to
manipulate the extracted features (from the primary layers of
neural networks) in a way that protects the data privacy against
unauthorized tasks by creating a feature set which is specific
to a desired task.
The hardest part of this approach is selecting the best
reduced set of features that provide a reasonable tradeoff
between utility and privacy. This approach is very dependent
on the method used by third parties because we need to
know if their services are compatible with this reduced set
of features or not. Furthermore, it is impossible to state
that a feature extracted from original data only and only
contains information about white-listed information and they
cannot reveal any information about black-listed activities. We
explain how these challenges can be answered by applying a
feature-based replacement instead of feature selection.
D. Replacement
As discussed in the previous sections, not only recognition
of sensitive activities, but also detection of the presence of
such activities in the published time-series can violate a data
subject’s privacy. The main idea of the replacement approach
is replacing sensitive sections of time-series with sections
very similar to the non-sensitive sections of the time-series.
This approach benefits the main advantages of the previously
mentioned approaches while mitigating their disadvantages.
For example, Saleheen et al. [15] argues that there is a high
degree of correlation between observed human behavior and
the data recorded by surrounding physiological sensors. They
proposed a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) model that,
instead of random substitution, uses user-specific substitution
as a mechanism to protect the privacy of black-listed behaviors
while preserving the classification accuracy for white-listed
behavior. But their model-based algorithm ignored gray-listed
inferences, it is offline and assumes the availability of all
time-series data before starting the replacement procedure.
They also maintain a mapping database, for use in the
replacement phase, that stores sensor segment of different
length for each possible state. In this paper, we propose
a feature-based replacement method that only needs users’
personal data to provide an online and robust replacement
method for privacy-preserving analysis of sensory data.
III. MEDIATOR ARCHITECTURE
There are several motivations and preference factors
involved when sharing personal sensor data. Users are very
conservative in some situations, and less concerned in other
cases. For this purpose, we need a personal and customizable
framework for users to control their privacy according to their
use of each application. Awareness of threats on collected
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Fig. 2. High-Level Architecture: a privacy-preserving mediator between
cloud servers and data subject. Sensitive sections of personal time-series are
transformed with the Mediator, based on the relevant application, and then
shared with the third party’s server.
time-series that can jeopardize the users’ privacy will help
them to choose whether to provide apps with their raw data or
applying some transformation before granting access to them.
In this section, we discuss the high-level architecture of the
Mediator: a personal platform that enables cloud services to
provide the user with desired services while protecting the
privacy of the data subject (see Figure 2).
Currently, there are two major approaches to sharing
sensor data for analyzing purposes. One is sharing the data
with trusted third parties without any alteration based on
non-disclosure agreements, but difficulties in trusting external
data processors is the main weakness of this approach. Another
solution is using one of the aforesaid methods in Section II) for
transforming data before publishing them to the untrusted third
parties. The tradeoff between information loss and user privacy
is the most challenging part of this approach. Moreover,
since in the both approaches data typically leaves users’ side
and resides in a shared environment such as cloud servers,
users no longer have any control over their data. Recently,
Haddadi et al. [24] developed a personal networked device,
enabling individuals to coordinate the collection of their
personal data, and to selectively and transiently make those
data available for specific purposes.
Considering these challenges, we propose a privacy by
design solution as an intermediate method that preserves
the privacy of sensitive information without the need to
trust third parties and simultaneously allow data subject to
benefit from cloud services for their desired applications.
Figure 2 shows the high-level architecture of the Mediator; a
privacy-preserving platform operates between cloud services
and data subject. Time-Series sensory data are processed
with the Mediator based on the relevant application and then
shared with the third party’s server. In fact, based on an
initial agreement between the user and the server, the Mediator
intelligently hides sensitive information before releasing data.
Generally, the main goal of the Mediator is to prevent the
reconstruction of original time-series from transformed ones,
yet allow to accurately estimate some statistics despite the
transformation.
As represented in figure 2 we have three major actors here:
• Server: a third party provides a desired service hosted in
the cloud (such as activity recognition, health monitoring,
occupancy detection, and smart home management).
Here, we assume it owns a machine learning model that
uses some of the features of the users’ time-series to
produce an output related to the requested service.
• User : a user owns some sensors that continuously
generate time-series data (such as noise, light, oxygen,
temperature, acceleration, humidity, motion, and etc. ).
User wants to benefit from cloud hosted services by
sharing their sensory data, but in a way that only desired
and non-sensitive information can be inferred.
• Mediator: this is generally a machine learning platform.
It creates a model for getting three major inputs:
(1) original time-series of User, (2) list of desired
inferences for Server, and (3) a personal dataset of
User including sensitive and non-sensitive data to train
Replacement AutoEncoder. After training, the Mediator
can transforms User’s data in real-time to send out to the
Server. Mediator divides time-series into a sequence of
sections and releases each section separately. It should
definitely be a trusted application that runs on the User
side. Recently, some architectures have been proposed
for mediating access to users’ personal data, under their
control, that can be used for this purpose [24].
In the following, we propose Replacement AutoEncoder as
an efficient data transformation algorithm for deploying in the
Mediator.
IV. FEATURE LEARNING
In this section, we motivate and outline our proposed
algorithm for online replacement of sensitive information
in time-series with non-sensitive data. We discuss the core
idea behind feature learning (also known as representation
learning), talk about the properties of autoencoder architecture
and its usefulness for our purposes, and inspired by
denoising autoencoder, proposed by Vincent et al. [5],
introduce a new architecture, replacement autoencoder, for
real-time privacy-preserving analysis of sensory data. We
show how discriminative features extracted by replacement
autoencoder can be used to replace sensitive information in
personal time-series with some non-sensitive data, without
loss of utility for specific tasks. Throughout the paper, we
will use the following notation: x is an input vector (a
section of time-series) and z is output vector which is
generated by neural network. b, g, and w will respectively
denote a black-listed, gray-listed, and white-listed section of
time-series. φ is an activation function and L(x, z) is a loss
function. An activation function (e.g. sigmoid function) of a
node in a neural network defines the output of that node given
a set of inputs, and a loss function considers the difference
between predicted and true values for an instance of input
data to measure how well a neural network is working.
A. Autoencoder
The performance of machine learning models is heavily
dependent on the type of data representation and the robustness
of extracted features on which they are applied. The key aspect
of feature learning is the intelligent extraction of features
from data and discover the informative representation needed
for desired task. LeCun et al. [25] argue that deep-learning
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Fig. 3. An autoencoder is a neural network that is trained to encode the
input x into some representation y = f(x) so that the output z = g(f(x)) is
a reconstruction of the input based on the representation. The autoencoder
tries to capture underlying explanatory factors and discover a robust and
discriminative feature set from training data. Each subset of this feature set
may be relevant for each particular inference in our desired task.
frameworks are in fact representation learning methods with
multiple levels of representation, obtained by composing
multilayer stack of non-linear modules that each transform the
representation at one level into a representation at a higher,
slightly more abstract level. Bengio et al. [26] have shown
that the hidden layers of a multilayer neural network (starting
with the raw input) can potentially learn more abstract features
at higher layers of representations and reuse a subset of these
features for each particular task. The earlier layers of a deep
neural network contain more generic features that should be
useful for many tasks, but later layers become progressively
more specific to the details of the classes relevant to the desired
task [27].
As depicted in Figure 3, an autoencoder takes an input
vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd, and first maps it to a
hidden representation y = (y1, y2, . . . , yd′) ∈ Rd
′
through
a deterministic mapping y = fθ(x) = φ(Wx + b),
parameterized by θ = {W , b}. φ is an activation function,
W is a d
′ × d weight matrix, and b is a bias vector.
Let us consider y as a feature set extracted by autoencoder,
and each yi in y to be equivalent to output of a node in the
middlemost layer of autoencoder (see Figure 3). The resulting
latent representation y is then mapped back to a reconstructed
vector z = gθ′ (y) = φ(W
′
y + b
′
) in input space (z ∈ Rd)
with θ
′
= {W ′ , b′}. The parameters of the autoencoder are
optimized to minimize average reconstruction error L(x, z):
θ∗, θ
′∗ = argθ,θ′ min
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(x(i), z(i)) (1)
where x(i) is the ith input data in the training dataset and L
is a loss function (e.g. squared error L(x, z) = ||x−z||2). In
fact, L(x, z) is a measure of the discrepancy between x and
its reconstruction z, over all provided training examples [28].
The autoencoder can include one or more hidden layers
that hold parameters which are used to represent the input. A
deep autoencoder captures the structure of the data-generating
distribution, by constraining the architecture to have a low
dimension (d
′
< d in Figure 3). Generally, the aim of an
autoencoder is to learn a representation (encoding) for a set
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Fig. 4. Replacement Autoencoder: inspired by denoising autoencoder
proposed by Vincent et al. [5]
of data, typically for the purpose of dimensionality reduction
or feature extraction. In an autoencoder, for each type of input
(corresponding to a specific class of data), a subset of hidden
units might be activated in response to it. In other words,
for any given input x, only a small fraction of the possible
features y
′ ⊆ y are relevant, thus the representation associated
with that input precisely describes which features respond
to the input, and how much. Deep architectures can lead to
abstract representations in the last layers. In fact, more abstract
concepts in the last layers can often be constructed in terms of
less abstract ones captured in the early layers. More abstract
concepts are generally invariant to most local changes of the
input hence the outputs are usually highly nonlinear functions
of the input.
B. Replacement Autoencoder
The denoising autoencoder, proposed by Vincent et al. [5],
is a special kind of autoencoder that receives a corrupted data
as input and is trained to predict the original, uncorrupted data
as its output. In section IV-A, we described how autoencoder
minimizes a loss function L(x, g(f(x))) penalizing g(f(x))
for being dissimilar from x. This encourages g(f(x)) to learn
to be merely an identity function. A denoising autoencoder
instead minimizes L(x, g(f(x˜))), where L is a loss function
and x˜ is a copy of x that has been corrupted by some form
of noise. Denoising autoencoders must therefore undo this
corruption rather than simply copying their input.
As an extension of denoising autoencoder, we introduce
Replacement AutoEncoder (RAE): a machine learning
architecture that can be utilized for transforming time-series
data in a way that sensitive information will be replaced with
non-sensitive data while desired information will be retained in
data. Therefore, the main objective is to train an autoencoder
to produce a non-sensitive output from a sensitive input, while
keeping other types of input unchanged.
As we see in the figure 4, this is achieved by “replacing each
black-listed section b with a gray-listed section gˆ by means of
a stochastic replacement rD(gˆ|b)” in the training phase. What
exactly the RAE is trying to do is implementing a piecewise
function:
z = RAE(xˆ = rD(x)) =
{
xSR if x is black-listed
x otherwise
(2)
Where we define xSR as a safe replacement for x. Ideally, we
say a replacement is safe if it does not reveal any information
about the data replacement operation. Therefore a replaced
vector z is as unsafe as the amount of information it reveals
about the data replacement method.
Here, as with the basic autoencoder, input vector x will be
mapped to an intermediate discriminative representation y =
fθ(x) = φ(Wx + b) from which we reconstruct a z =
g
θ
′ (y) = φ(W
′
y + b
′
). The key aspect of RAE is that in
the training phase, it tries to minimize the average replacement
error L(xˆ, z) over the training set
θ∗, θ
′∗ = argθ,θ′ min
1
n
n∑
i=1
L(xˆ(i), z(i)) (3)
where, xˆ is a replaced version of x, which can be white-listed,
black-listed or gray-listed data. Again, θ = {W , b} and
θ
′
= {W ′ , b′} are respectively weight matrices and bias
vectors for encoding and decoding parts. RAE generates z as
close as possible to the partially replaced input xˆ. It minimizes
the criterion in equation 3 instead of equation 1, therefore,
the transformed data, z, is a function of xˆ: the result of a
stochastic replacement of x (see Figure 4).
The key idea of the Replacement AutoEncoder is in
training phase of autoencoder: “we train RAE in a way
that it learns how to transform discriminative features that
correspond to sensitive inferences, as shown in Figure 3, into
some features that have been more observed in non-sensitive
inferences, and at the same time, keeps important features
of desired inferences unchanged”. Intuitively, RAE can be
seen as an algorithm for data transformation where the related
functions learned automatically from data provided rather than
engineered by experts. Note that, autoencoders only be able
to reconstruct data similar to what they have been trained
on. For example, an autoencoder trained on running activity
data generated by an accelerometer sensor would do a rather
poor job of reconstructing drinking or smoking activity data
generated by the same sensor, because the features it would
learn are just useful for reconstructing data correspond to
running or similar activities like walking or jogging.
In section VI we discuss the safety of the RAE outputs.
We will show that if adversaries have access to the dataset of
original gray-listed data which was used to train the RAE, they
can utilize it to train a Generative Adversarial Network [8] for
distinguishing between a real gray-listed section of time-series
and a transformed one. Therefore, although the recognition
of the exact type of sensitive inferences without any side
information is still impossible, personal data leak could lead
to the reduced safety of replacement operation. Finally, an
advantage of RAE is that it automatically learns features.
For this reason, it is easy to customize them to produce a
personal mediator framework, described in section III, that
will perform well on a specific type of input. It doesn’t require
re-engineering, just appropriate personal data for training. We
clarify this process by experimental results provided in the
section V-B.
TABLE I
ACTIVITY CLASSES AND OTHER PROPERTIES OF EACH DATASET
#
Name of Dataset
Opportunity Skoda Hand-Gesture
Activities
0 null null null
1 open door1 write notes open window
2 open door2 open hood close window
3 close door1 close hood water a plant
4 close door2 check front door turn book
5 open fridge open left f door drink a bottle
6 close fridge close left f door cut w/ knife
7 open washer close left doors chop w/ knife
8 close washer check trunk stir in a bowl
9 open drawer1 open/close trunk forehand
10 close drawer1 check wheels backhand
11 open drawer2 smash
12 close drawer2
13 open drawer3
14 close drawer3
15 clean table
16 drink cup
17 toggle switch
Subjects 4 people 1 person 2 people
Sampling Rate 30 Hz 98 Hz 32 Hz
Dimension (d) 113 60 15
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets
Experiments are conducted on three benchmark datasets:
Opportunity [29], Skoda [30], and Hand-Gesture [31].
1) Opportunity: This dataset, famously known as the
Opportunity Activity Recognition 2, contains naturalistic
human activities recorded in a sensor environment where
subjects performed daily morning activities. Two types of
recording sessions were performed: Drill sessions where the
subject performs sequentially a pre-defined set of activities
and “activity of daily living” runs (ADL). Each record in the
dataset comprises 113 sensory readings and the sampling rate
of the sensor signals is 30 Hz [32]. We use Drill and the
first four sets of ADLs as the training data, and use the fifth
set of ADL as the testing data. The data is composed of the
recordings of 4 subjects and there are 18 gestures classes in
this activity recognition task (Table I). The null class refers
to the either non-relevant activities or non-activities. A large
amount of data in this dataset matches the gray-listed Null
class (about 62%). For this reason it does not present much
of a challenge to the RAE. We make the task artificially
harder by reducing the amount of gray-listed data by removing
a high percentage of the null data. We randomly remove
some instances of this class to obtain more realistic results.
Therefore, we keep only 25% of the instances of data matching
the Null class to make the problem harder for RAE.
2) Skoda: This dataset describes the activities of
assembly-line workers in a car production environment3.
They consider the recognition of 11 activity classes
performed in one of the quality assurance checkpoints of the
production plant (Table I). In their study, one subject wore
2http://www.opportunity-project.eu
3http://www.ife.ee.ethz.ch/research/activity-recognition-datasets.html
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19 3D accelerometers on both arms and perform a set of
experiments using sensors placed on the two arms of a tester
(10 sensors on the right arm and 9 sensor on the left arm).
The original sample rate of this dataset was 98 Hz, but it
was decimated to 30 Hz for comparison purposes with the
other two datasets. The Skoda dataset has been employed
to evaluate deep learning techniques in sensor networks [7],
which makes it a proper dataset to evaluate our proposed
framework.
3) Hand-Gesture: In this dataset, sensory data about
recognizing hand gestures from body-worn accelerometers and
gyroscopes is recorded4. There are two subjects perform hand
movements with 8 gestures in regular daily activity and with
3 gestures in playing tennis, so in total, there are 12 classes
(Table I). Every subject repeated all activities about 26 times.
Similar to the other datasets, the null class refers to the periods
of no specific activity. The sampling rate of dataset is 32 Hz
and each record has 15 real valued sensor readings in total.
For all datasets, we fill up the missing values using
linear interpolation and normalize each sensor’s data to
have zero mean and unit standard deviation. For Skoda
and Hand-Gesture datasets, we randomly select 80% of
time-windows for training phase and the remaining 20% is
used for the tests.
B. Experimental Settings
We consider Human Activity Recognition problem (HAR)
and a setting in which there are a list of |c| different inference
classes: I = {I1, ..., Ii, ..., Ij , ..., Ic}. We divide inferences
into three distinct categories:
1) desired activities: Iw = {I1, I2, ..., Ii}
2) sensitive activities: Ib = {Ii+1, Ii+2, ..., Ij}
3) non-sensitive activities: Ig = {Ij+1, Ii+2, ..., Ic}
where i < j. We assume when a service is requested from
third parties, they announce the list of required inferences
to be drawn to make the service works properly. We put
these inferences (activities) in the list of desired inferences
Iw. Moreover, we assume users know what kind of inferences
are non-sensitive for them. Therefore, users announce a list of
non-sensitive inferences Ig (e.g. null classes in datasets). In
our experiments, we put the remaining inferences into sensitive
4https://github.com/andreas-bulling/ActRecTut
inferences Ib. Thus, in our experiments we utilize datasets to
train RAE in this way:
(a) Following [6], we consider a sliding window with size d
and step size w to segment the time-series of k sensors
into a set of sections. Specifically, a two-dimensional
matrix containing k rows of time-series of which each
row consists of d data points. For all datasets we set
d = 30 and w = 3. Moreover, the activity label of
each sliding window is assigned by the most-frequently
appeared label in all d records. In this way, we have a
training dataset contains labeled sections of time-series.
We divide training dataset into three disjoint sets, by
considering Ib, Iw, and Ig in each experiment.
(b) We train the RAE for performing the feature-based
replacement. As we said in section IV, autoencoders
try to learn an approximation to the identity function,
so as to output z that is similar to input x. Thus, for
implementing the idea of Replacement AutoEncoder, we
set X = W ∪ G ∪ B and Z = W ∪ G ∪ Gˆ, where
X = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)} is input data in the training
phase of RAE, and Z = {z(1), z(2), . . . , z(n)} is the
corresponding output. W , G, and B are respectively data
instances corresponding to white-listed, gray-listed, and
black-listed inferences. Gˆ is a randomly selected subset
of G sections with the same size with the B. By replacing
B with Gˆ, RAE learns how to replace sections of a
time-series that contain sensitive data with non-sensitive
data (implementation of equation 3 ).
(c) We implemented RAE using Keras5 framework. The
activation function for input and output layers is linear
and for all of the hidden layer is Scaled Exponential
Linear Unit (selu) [33]. Since we normalize data to
have a zero mean and unity standard deviation, selu
does not filter out negative numbers, thus it is a better
choice than Rectified Linear Unit (relu). The loss
function in training phase is chosen to be Mean Squared
Error (mse), because we want to retain the overall
structure of reconstructed sections. The dimension of
RAE input is inp = [ k × d, 1] , and it has five hidden
layers with size inp/2, inp/8, inp/16, inp/8, inp/2
respectively (except for Hand-Gesture dataset, which
5https://keras.io/
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TABLE II
F1 SCORES FOR SKODA DATASET (IN ALL THE TABLES, OF1 STANDS FOR
ORIGINAL DATA AND TF1 STANDS FOR TRANSFORMED ONE)
Hand List of Inferences (Table I) OF1 TF1
Left
Iw = {4, 8, 9, 10} 97.92 96.32
Ib = {1, 5, 6, 7} 96.24 0.00
Ig = {0, 2, 3} 94.34 93.42
Left
Iw = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9} 96.52 93.23
Ib = {4, 8, 10} 97.88 0.00
Ig = {0, 1} 93.86 94.85
Right
Iw = {1, 4, 10} 97.56 94.9
Ib = {2, 3, 8, 9} 97.97 0.00
Ig = {0, 5, 6, 7} 92.33 88.23
Right
Iw = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9} 95.76 91.06
Ib = {4, 8, 10} 97.39 0.00
Ig = {0, 1} 94.31 92.39
TABLE III
F1 SCORES FOR HAND-GESTURE DATASET
Subject List of Inferences (Table I) OF1 TF1
#1
Iw = {1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11} 94.11 90.15
Ib = {5, 6, 7, 8} 95.75 0.26
Ig = {0} 95.04 96.54
#1
Iw = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} 95.23 90.45
Ib = {2, 8, 9, 10, 11} 94.53 0.62
Ig = {0} 95.04 97.46
#2
Iw = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} 97.21 93.30
Ib = {2, 9, 10, 11} 92.54 0.71
Ig = {0} 95.89 97.53
#2
Iw = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9} 96.10 92.13
Ib = {4, 8, 10} 96.96 0.52
Ig = {0, 1} 95.70 97.56
is inp/2, inp/3, inp/4, inp/3, inp/2, because of low
dimensionality of data). All the experiments have been
performed on 30 epochs with batch size 128. (see
Figure 6)
To evaluate the performance of time-series transformation
by RAE, we implemented one of the best methods for
HAR that have been proposed recently [6] as a third
party model. They build a Convolutional Neural Network to
investigate the multichannel time-series data. We compare the
performance of third party model on transformed time-series
with original ones and show that utility will retain for all
of the activities included in white-listed inferences, while
recognizing an activity correspond to black-listed inferences is
near impossible. Both the original and transformed time-series
are given to the third party model for classification task and
TABLE IV
F1 SCORES FOR OPPORTUNITY DATASET
Subject List of Inferences (Table I) OF1 TF1
#1
Iw={9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17} 71.75 64.32
Ib={1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8} 79.15 0.21
Ig={0} 88.93 89.70
#1
Iw={1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,15,17} 76.87 75.93
Ib={9,10,11,12,13,14} 71.49 1.32
Ig={0,16} 84.44 82.08
#3
Iw={9,10,11,12,13,14,16} 74.92 77.07
Ib={1,2,3,4,15,17} 76.16 0.92
Ig ={0,5,6,7,8} 84.98 81.58
#3
Iw={1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,15,17} 70.32 65.05
Ib={9,10,11,12,13,14,16} 74.92 6.31
Ig={0,1} 93.72 92.95
F1 scores are calculated in Table II, Table III, and Table IV.
The results show that utility will retain for desired activities,
while recognizing sensitive activities is near impossible. The
most valuable result is that third party’s model misclassifies all
transformed sections correspond to black-listed inferences (B)
into the gray-listed inferences (G). Therefore, the false-positive
rate on white-listed inferences is very low (see Figure 7).
C. Visualization
It is a very challenging task to visualize multi-channel
time-series, especially in our high-dimensional setting. In
this section, in order to better understand the idea of
Replacement AutoEncoder, we present and discuss some
perceptible examples.
The MNIST database of handwritten digits [34], is the
most famous dataset for evaluating learning techniques and
pattern recognition methods. It contains 60, 000 training
images and 10, 000 testing images. As an explicit example,
in our setting, we consider 0 as a kind of non-sensitive
inference (gray-listed), other even numbers (2, 4, 6, 8) as a
set of sensitive inferences (black-listed), and all of the odd
numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) as desired information we want to keep
unchanged. Figure 8 shows the output of the RAE when it
receives some samples from test set as input. RAE transformed
all of the images categorized as sensitive information into
images that are undoubtedly recognized as 0 by humans
and also image recognition algorithms. This is just a simple
example to build an intuitive sense of how our method
can learn the piecewise function described in equation 2 to
selectively censor sensitive information in personal data.
Fig. 7. Confusion Matrix: (Left) Original time-series . (Right) Transformed
time-series. It shows that, after transformation, almost all of the black-listed
activities (B) are recognized as gray-listed ones (G). (Top) Results relate to
Skoda dataset (left hand) for these lists: IW = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9}, IB =
{4, 8, 10}, IG = {0, 1}. (Middle) Results relate to Hand-Gesture dataset
(subject 1) for these lists: IW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11}, IB = {5, 6, 7, 8},
IG = {0}. (Bottom) Results relate to Opportunity dataset (subject 1) for these
lists: IW = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17}, IB = {9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14},
IG = {0, 16}
Fig. 8. Outputs of replacement autoencoder in MNIST handwritten
digits [34]: (Top) Considering 0 as non-sensitive (gray-listed) and information
other even numbers as sensitive (black-listed) ones. (Bottom) Considering all
the odd numbers as desired information.
For visualizing time-series data which are used in the
experiments, we implement t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor
Embedding (t-SNE) [35]. At the moment, it is one of the most
common algorithm for 2D visualization of high-dimensional
datasets. t-SNE is a technique for dimensionality reduction and
a well known strategy for visualizing similarity relationships,
between different classes in the dataset, in high-dimensional
B
W
G
G
W
B
Fig. 9. The effect of applying feature-based transformation using replacement
autoencoder on time-series: feature space relationships among different classes
of activities for Skoda dataset (first row of table II ). (Top) t-SNE on original
time-series. (Bottom) t-SNE on transformed time-series.
data. It uses PCA to compress high-dimensional data (e.g.
1800 for Skoda dataset [30]) into a low-dimensional space
(e.g. 100 dimensional), then maps the compressed data to a
2D plane that can be plotted easily. Since t-SNE cares about
preserving the local structure of the high-dimensional data,
we use it to describe how the RAE would push sensitive data
points, in the original data space, into areas that correspond
to non-sensitive inferences, and at the same time preserve the
separability and structures of desired data points 6.
Figure 9 shows the feature space relationships among
different classes of activities for Skoda dataset. Regarding the
scatter plots depicted in Figure 9, black-listed data points in
original time-series (top plot) have their own structures and
clearly separable from other classes. But, in the transformed
version of time-series (bottom plot) all of the black-listed data
points have been moved into another area of feature-space
which is more closely related to gray-listed data points. They
also lose their recognizable patterns and all of them mapped
to almost the same area of the feature space. On the other
hand, it maintains particular patterns of white-listed data
points, thus causes no harm to the recognition accuracy of
desired activities. Note that in this example, we reduce the
dimensionality from 1800-d to just 2-d, which leads to huge
information loss. t-SNE has two tunable parameters, initial
dimension (in this experiment it is equal to 100), and perplexity
(here is 60). Perplexity is a measure for information that is
defined as 2 to the power of the Shannon entropy.
6 Using codes implemented in https://lvdmaaten.github.io/tsne
Fig. 10. GAN’s accuracy in
distinguishing different kinds of real,
fake and generated sections (the
Skoda dataset - first row of table II).
Fig. 11. GAN’s accuracy in detecting
real gray-listed data by having access
to other users’ data (the Opportunity
dataset - first row of table IV).
VI. THREAT MODEL
We assume adversaries know the algorithm which is used
for transforming time-series, they have access to the user’s
transformed time-series data, and also they have access to a
dataset contain data corresponding to all the real gray-listed
data which the user uses to train his/her model. If an attacker
can determine when gray-listed data from RAE is “fake”
(replacing black-listed data) then RAE is no more useful than
filtering. Hence it is important for us to show that to what
extent the replacement gray-listed data that RAE writes over
black-listed data is indistinguishable from the real gray-listed
data output by RAE.
For this purpose, we use a Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) [8]. GANs are neural networks that learn to create
synthetic data similar to some known input data. GANs consist
of two models: a generative model G and a discriminative
model D. The model D is basically a binary classifier that
determines whether a given input looks like a real input from
the dataset or like an artificially created data. The model
G takes random input values and uses feedback from the
classifier D to produce convincing data that the classifier D
can’t distinguish from real data. Thus, we use the GAN for
evaluating the output of the RAE as follows.
First, we assume that adversaries will try to detect whether
the current sections, recognized as a non-sensitive activity, are
real or fake. Thus, they train a GAN on the obtained gray-listed
dataset, based on the code implemented in [36]. In this GAN,
G learns to produce sections very similar to real gray-listed
sections and D learns to determine whether the given sections,
recognized as non-sensitive data, are real gray-listed sections
or fake ones. Second, after training the GAN, we separate the
discriminative part D and give it as input: (i) real gray-listed
sections, (ii)fake gray-listed sections, (iii)randomly generated
gray-listed sections by G, and (iv)the top 10% randomly
generated gray-listed sections as rated by discriminator D.
We measure binary classification accuracy rate for these four
categories. The results are shown in Figure 10.
The results demonstrate that the output of the RAE is
almost as similar as the random data generated by G but
not quite as good as the best data generated by G. We
see that when we give D more time to learn, it eventually
distinguishes between real gray-listed sections and fake ones.
Therefore, if the user’s non-sensitive data which is used to train
his/her model is leaked out, it will be easy for adversaries to
distinguish between real and fake non-sensitive data. Thus, in
this situation, the safety of our proposed replacement method
will be reduced to the safety of filtering approach.
We also conducted another experiment to investigate
whether the privacy of user i can be compromised by having
access to the original gray-listed data of another user j.
Figure 11 shows the accuracy of the binary discriminator
D for distinguishing between real and fake gray-listed data
of subject #3 when D have been trained on gray-listed data
from subject #1. Results show that D cannot recognize real
gray-listed data as real, and its error rate is about 70%. Though
it recognizes all fake gray-listed data as fake, it is not valuable
because it recognizes real data as fake as well. Thus, we see
that a GAN can be a good discriminator only if adversaries
gain access to real data from the attacked user and data from
other users is not sufficient. Note that in this experiment the
list of black-listed and gray-listed inferences is the same for
both data subjects.
We can see from Figure 10 that the GAN performance
in classifying data began to improve slowly from epoch 10
to epoch 30 and stabilized by epoch 70. By contrast even
after 100 epochs in Figure 11 there is no consistent pattern of
improvement for the GAN without access to the individuals
gray-listed data and it seems unlikely that the GAN will ever
learn to distinguish this data.
VII. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
Historically, Westin [37] has defined information privacy
as “the right to select what personal information about me is
known to what people”. Recently, Ziegeldorf et al. [4] extends
this definition for IoT privacy by “having individual control
over the processing of personal information and awareness
of the subsequent use of them”. Here, we discuss the recent
progress in the protection of users’ privacy in time-series data
analysis and compare them with our approach.
Anonymization. In the past decade, there has been
some remarkable progress in the field of preserving privacy
in tabular data publishing, such as k-anonymity [38]
and l-diversity [39]. These approaches, more known as
anonymization methods, mainly protect the identity of the
data owners by coarse-graining methods. They try to retain
essential information for analysis but suppress or generalize
other identity attributes. In this paper, instead of anonymity, we
consider a situation where untrusted third parties know users’
identity and we introduce a method which prevents inferring
sensitive information from their personal time-series.
Randomization. An approach for protecting sensitive
inferences is data randomization which perturbs data by
multiplicative or additive noise, or other randomized processes.
Zhang et al. [40] developed a time-series pattern based noise
generation strategy (called noise obfuscation) for privacy
protection on the cloud. It generates and injects noise
service requests into real ones to ensure that their occurrence
probabilities are about the same so that service providers
cannot distinguish which requests are real ones. To protect
the user from inference attacks on his private data, Erdogdu
et al. [41] proposed a method that sequentially randomizes
samples from the time-series prior to their release according to
a stochastic process, called the privacy mapping. For example,
a household is willing to give the aggregate electrical load to
the service provider, but wishes to keep the information related
to their eating patterns private, in particular the microwave
usage which can also be inferred from the aggregate load.
Allard et al. [42] proposed Chiaroscuro, a solution for
clustering personal time-series that are distributed on personal
devices with privacy guarantees. Chiaroscuro allows the
participating devices to collaborate privately by combining
encryption with differential privacy [11]. Generally, because
of high temporal and spatial granularity of time-series and
strong correlation between their samples, when general data
randomization approaches are extended to the dynamic case of
time-series data, scalability challenges arise and maintaining
utility often becomes challenging [41]. For this reason, we
focus on a scalable method for effectively hiding sensitive
information by only replacing sensitive sections of time-series
without perturbing the desired and non-sensitive data.
Deep Learning Frameworks: Liu et al. [43] proposed
a collaborative privacy-preserving deep learning system in
mobile environment, which enables multiple sites to learn
deep learning model only by sharing partial parameters with
each other. In their approach, the privacy is protected by
keeping data in local and use a parameter selection mechanism
to only share small fraction of the parameters to the server
at each round. Phan et al. [9] enforce -differential privacy
by injecting noise into the objective functions of the deep
autoencoders at every layer and training step. By considering
the need to protect sensitive inferences, we introduce a novel
algorithm for feature learning which can be utilized for
real-time privacy-preserving time-series publishing. It uses a
new objective function for learning a deep autoencoder by
automatically extraction of discriminative features from input
time-series .
Discussion: Here we discuss some important advantages of
RAE for privacy-preserving analysis of sensory data.
• No sensitive activities can be inferred: RAE is trained to
transform blacklisted sections into the same-size sections
that are very similar to gray-listed activates. Therefore,
on the cloud side, only non-sensitive gray-listed activities
can be inferred.
• No loss in utility: autoencoder transformed white-listed
sections with the least amount of changes, because it
is trained to copy these sections as exactly as possible.
In addition, it will learn to transform both gray-listed
and black-listed activities to gray-listed ones. So, the
amount of false positive (wrongly recognizing an activity
as white-listed) is near to zero. This is very important to
the quality of services provided to the user.
• No detection of sensitive intervals: in noise addition and
filtering, third parties can easily detect time intervals
corresponding to sensitive activities. They can use this
knowledge alongside other side information to conclude
about the type of related activity. In our feature-based
replacement approach it is very hard to distinguish
between sensitive and non-sensitive time interval, unless
adversaries get access to the original gray-listed data
which have used for training RAE.
• No hand selected feature set: in the mapping (feature
publishing) approach we need to go through the
reduced representation of a time-series and divide
them into white-listed and black-listed feature sets.
In feature-based replacement we publish transformed
version of time-series with the same dimensionality of
original data and have not concerned about separating
features. In fact RAE can automatically transform
features correspond to black-listed data while retaining
the features correspond to white activities unchanged.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The protection of users’ privacy in time-series analysis is a
very challenging task, especially when time-series are gathered
from different sources. Invasion of privacy arises when
disseminated data can be used to draw sensitive inferences
about the data subject. In this paper, we have focused on
the inference privacy and considered time-series generated
by sensors embedded into mobile and wearable devices. We
have introduced Replacement AutoEncoder: a feature learning
algorithm which learns how to transform discriminative
features that correspond to sensitive inferences, into some
features that have been more observed in non-sensitive data,
and at the same time, keeps important features of desired
inferences unchanged to benefit from cloud services. We
evaluate the efficacy of the method with an activity recognition
task using experiments on three benchmark datasets and
show that it can preserve the privacy of sensitive information
while simultaneously retaining the recognition accuracy of
state-of-the-art techniques .
We believe that the approach of learning privacy-related
features from time-series data will enable us to develop
efficient methods for data transformation and help us to
enrich existing IoT platform with a robust privacy-preserving
time-series data analytics component. Thus, in the future, we
will focus on extending the mediator framework by letting
users dynamically define their personal privacy policies and
inferences that applications are allowed to access. We will
also investigate theoretical frameworks and other mathematical
tools to determine a bound on sensitive information that
remains in the transformed time-series. Beside GANs, we
will pay attention to other possible attacks and appropriate
responses to them as well as comparing the achieved
utility-privacy tradeoff of replacement with other privacy
approaches, such as randomization or filtering. Another
direction for continuing this research could be using Long
Short Term Memory (LSTMs) networks [44] which are
capable of learning long-term dependencies in data to capture
the discriminative features of time-series.
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